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NEGOTIATING FOR SURVIVAL: 
BALANCING MISSION AND 
MONEY  
Abstract 
The impetus for prioritising money over mission in charities is increasingly pertinent as 
public sector austerity progresses in the UK.  Mid size charities – who are heavily reliant on 
grant funding - have experienced proportionately greater challenges to austerity than larger 
entities.  A substantial part of accountability efforts in mid size charities are directed towards 
funders, where funder imposed frameworks and measures may direct charity attention away 
from social mission towards funder needs, causing mission drift. Four charity case studies, 
and grant funder interviews were conducted to investigate how charities can pursue social 
mission in a challenging funding environment.  This paper shows that charities can protect 
social mission despite high dependence on grant funding, but is also provides evidence of 
susceptibility to mission drift in cases where the balance between money and mission 
changes. Charity accounting systems display notable funder influence.  A resource 
dependence perspective is utilised to highlight the complexity in assessing dependence of 
charities in a challenging environment and demonstrates the extent of funder influence in 
accounting and performance systems in these charities.  However, charities employ strategies 
to cope with external requirements enabling them to retain mission focus.  
Keywords: 
Resource Dependence Perspective; Charities; Grant Funders; Mission Drift  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of mission drift in charities has become increasingly prevalent, particularly as 
public sector austerity progresses in the UK (Hyndman, 2017). Mission drift can be observed 
when an organisation deviates from its original mission (Jones, 2007). The external funding 
environment has been identified as a cause of mission drift in charitable organisations, as 
efforts are directed towards upward accountability (Bennett & Savani, 2011; Christensen & 
Ebrahim, 2006; Hudson, 2010; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008).   However, underlying causes 
of mission drift are more complex than magnitude of financial reliance on funders 
(Verschuere & Corte, 2014) and there is case evidence that social mission can be maintained 
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despite high financial dependence (Doyle, Kelly, & O’Donohoe, 2016).  This paper utilises a 
resource dependence perspective (RDP) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Mitchell, 2014) to 
analyse four mid size charities – defined as those with an income of between £25k and £1m 
(NCVO, 2016) - in Scotland amidst a challenging grant funding environment (Hyndman, 
2017). Grant funders are the largest funders of mid size charities in Scotland (SCVO, 2014), 
therefore concerns about mission drift are inevitably linked to the nature and extent of grant 
funding (Bennett & Savani, 2011). To that end, this paper seeks to answer the following 
research question: How do mid size charities continue to pursue social mission in conditions 
of high dependence on grants?  It is argued here that RDP can effectively explain how 
charities protect mission whilst addressing financial scarcity.      
Specifically, RDP demonstrates that mission drift can gain traction through accounting and 
performance information produced in charities responding to funder demands. As well as 
external reports for grant awards, management accounting information is also shaped by 
funder stipulations, influencing decision making in charities. Performance measurements are 
also shaped by funder needs, creating susceptibility to mission drift.  Yet RDP can also 
explain and identify why mission focus is maintained despite high financial dependency. 
Charity management absorb environmental demands and create conditions which protect 
social mission.  Organisational factors, such as growth and adaptability also support mission 
focus.  Finally, RDP demonstrates that dependency is a complex interplay of financial 
requirements, charity cost structures and the nature of services delivered.    The paper 
contributes findings which demonstrate the importance of funder influence on accounting 
information; the need to investigate charity accounting more widely (Connolly, Hyndman, & 
McConville, 2011; Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009) and the resilience of smaller charities 
seeking funds (van der Heijden, 2013).   
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 considers the nature of mission drift in charities, 
section 3 discusses RDP and its resonance in a charitable setting, section 4 outlines the 
research design, and section 5 presents the findings analysed using key insights of RDP.  
Finally, concluding thoughts are presented in section 6.  
2. Mission Drift and Funder Accountability 
 
At the most basic level, mission drift occurs when a charity deviates from its original 
mission. There is however, ambiguity around what constitutes mission drift - which tends to 
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be quite loosely defined - and how it impacts upon charities (Copestake, 2007). Similarly, the 
identification of mission drift can be problematic, it may appear clearly visible as a formal 
change in mission, strategy or objectives (Cornforth, 2014). In contrast, it may be something 
much subtler in terms of working practices or quality of service (Cornforth, 2014; Weisbrod, 
2004). Mission drift is generally associated with negative connotations, for example Jones 
(2007) labels the underlying causes as ‘threats’, however positive consequences of mission 
drift are also noted (Bennett & Savani, 2011). There are also instances where mission drift 
may be a necessity, for example if the needs of beneficiaries have changed, although a 
challenge exists in distinguishing such changes from mission drift (Bielefeld, 2009). Mission 
drift in charities can come from many sources, with two of the most common causes being 
attributed to the pursuit of business-like approaches in the management of charities 
(Hyndman, 2017; Ramus & Vaccaro, 2017; Weisbrod, 2004)  and conditions of the external 
funding environment (Jones, 2007). Hyndman (2017) discusses how such New Public 
Management approaches have made their way across to the charity sector as a result of public 
sector funding, for example performance reporting requirements insisted upon by funders.  
The external environment is particularly pertinent to this current study, where external forces 
(grant funders) exert control over charities to move them away from their core mission: 
 
“Mission drift arises when a charity’s priorities and activities are determined in part 
by external funders and, in consequence, the organization’s operations then deviate 
significantly from its original mission. Typically, the driving force behind mission 
drift is an outside funding body’s desire that a charity alter the scope or contents of its 
services to match more closely the funder’s requirements” (Bennett & Savani, 2011, 
p.218). 
 
There is evidence that different types of funding and funder requirements impact on social 
mission in different ways (Thompson & Williams, 2014), for example they may request 
bespoke reporting information, which complies with funder needs over charitable service 
improvements and diverting staff attention from other stakeholders.  
 
For charities, funders are the primary stakeholder to which accountability activities are 
directed (Connolly et al, 2013) and mission drift can be caused when working to fulfil funder 
requirements (Coyte, Rooney & Phua, 2013; Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006). Much has been 
written about the interplay between accountability mechanisms and mission in charities, 
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where the hierarchical, functional model of accountability tends to dominate over a broader 
holistic1 one (Cordery, Baskerville & Porter, 2010; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007). 
Hierarchical reporting focuses more on quantitative measures of achievement and custom 
funder measurements (Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Cordery et al, 2010; Moxham, 2010, 
2013). Reporting to funders can then be construed as a burden, unrepresentative of charitable 
goals and vision, and focusing on compliance, with little contribution to service 
improvement. Furthermore, the focus on accountability to funders can come at the expense of 
other stakeholders to whom accountability is due, and this in turn can be counterproductive to 
mission (McKinney & Khan, 2004; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008). One distinct contrast 
to previous studies is O’Dwyer & Boomsma (2015) who report on a situation whereby rather 
than reporting requirements being entirely imposed by the funder, they are co-produced by 
both funders and charities. The nuances of funder relationships are therefore pertinent.  
 
Further evidence of the ways in which charities utilise ‘coping strategies’ to manage the 
tensions between funder requirements and mission suggest that charities can be proactive in 
avoiding mission drift (Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Cornforth, 2014). In contrast, a study 
by Bennett & Savani (2011) found that case charities saw mission drift as an ‘inevitable’ part 
of government contract funding. In this study however, mission drift was found to have a 
positive impact on charities, who chose to go beyond the provision of the services they were 
contracted to supply and proactively expanded what they could offer to take full strategic 
responsibility for state-funded activities. The issues of addressing mission drift which has 
already occurred was investigated by Ramus & Vaccaro (2007). Here, a combination of 
social accounting and stakeholder engagement was successful in redirecting the organisation 
back towards its socially oriented motivations.  
 
While a number of studies have highlighted the tension between funding and mission, few 
studies have analysed how these conflicts manifest specifically within accounting and 
performance systems, and how charities then buffer the impact on mission. RDP is well 
placed in connecting the challenging financial environment for charities with the work 
performed to achieve social mission. Furthermore, current fiscal austerity is particularly 
pertinent for testing RDP as it suggests resource scarcity motivates action, with managers 
                                                 
1 For further elaboration on broader conceptualisations of accountability see Jørgensen & Larsen (1987) and 
Stone (1995). 
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prioritising strategies to manage interdependencies (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). The following 
section explains RDP and its resonance to charities in more detail.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework: Resource Dependence 
 
To understand the relationship between dependence on grant income and mission autonomy, 
a resource dependence perspective (RDP) is utilised. Since Pfeffer & Salancik’s seminal 
publication in 1978, scholars have continued to apply and extend RDP (Drees & Heugens, 
2013; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). However, the importance of the original 
contribution by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) continues to be emphasised (see Cohen, 
Guillamón, Lapsley & Robbins, 2015; Froelich, 1999). In fact, Hillman et al (2009), 
undertaking a review of resource dependence conclude that “although the basic tenets of 
RDT are well supported, it has not experienced substantial theoretical development or 
refinement” (p.16). The current study engages what we view as the sometimes overlooked 
ideas of this theory. There remains empirical work to be done in RDP, as the link between 
resource dependence and the predicted organisational impact have not always been 
straightforward (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pXX).   Furthermore, the 
focus on RDP has centred on the structural organisational responses to resource dependence 
and less attention has been on the information systems within organisations, a key aspect of 
this current study.   Indeed, the 2003 reprint of The External Control of Organizations 
identified that: 
“There is little research that attempts to explore the complete connection between 
environmental constraint and internal organizational dynamics, including outcomes 
other than who occupies critical organizational positions and their backgrounds” 
(pXiX) 
This section will proceed by presenting the key insights of RDP, before considering some 
specific developments in charity research. 
 
3.1 Resource Dependence: Key Insights 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) articulate RDP in terms of organisational survival:  
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‘To survive, organizations require resources. Typically, acquiring resources means the 
organizations must interact with others who control those resources. In that sense, 
organizations depend on their environments. Because the organization does not 
control the resources it needs, resource acquisition may be problematic and uncertain. 
Others who control resources may be undependable, particularly when resources are 
scarce. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:258). 
 
Organisations therefore require resources to survive and must obtain these resources from the 
environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In return for resources or capabilities, the 
environment receives some ability to control and direct organisational action (ibid, p27).  
However, RDP recognises that dependent organisations are not passive, and highlights the 
importance of adapting to such environmental uncertainties, managing interdependencies and 
internal dynamics so external environmental influence is minimised (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). 
 
External influence in organisations is shaped by the interdependence of different entities and 
individuals in an environment.  Interdependence can have consequences for an organisation.  
Organisations will concentrate efforts on responding to environmental demands depending on 
the relative importance of the resource to the organisation’s survival, considering both 
magnitude and criticality to the organisation.  Furthermore, the organisation will consider the 
amount of discretion enjoyed by the contributing actor as to how resources are deployed 
internally.  Finally, interdependence analyses the concentration of resources within the 
environment and the ability of the organisation to seek alternative relationships.  Taken 
together, these insights on interdependence can establish a more holistic perspective on 
dependency in the grant funding environment for charities than focusing exclusively on the 
amount of financial connections between two entities at one given time.   
 
However, the social control of organisations through resource dependence requires that actors 
within an organisation are aware of the environment and respond to it.  RDP terms this the 
‘enacted environment’ (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p63), to which the information system is 
central.  The nature of information produced and used by an entity is the key link between 
organisational actions and environmental inputs (ibid, p74).  As environmental demands 
change, so does the information that the organisation processes as part of its activities (ibid, 
p76). Managerial responses change as the environment is enacted through information 
produced by the entities: 
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“Information filters leave out some information and later other information; 
people in organisations focus on what they have been trained to notice and on 
those things relevant to their jobs…that which is measured is attended to, and that 
which is not measured ignored.” (ibid, p81) 
 
The enacted environment within an organisation therefore is inherently subjective and is 
subject to the information produced internally.  This is highly pertinent in charities using 
accounting and performance information to obtain grants in a stretched funding environment.     
The potential for mission drift is also exhibited through this enactment of the environment.  If 
mission is absent from information produced by entities, it will not be attended to, and drift 
could occur.   
 
Once the environment is enacted through information systems, the organisation attends to 
demands of the environment whilst trying to maximise autonomy within. Several responses 
to environmental demand have been articulated (Pfeffer and Salancik,1978; Mitchell, 2012).   
Compliance to environmental demands is a straightforward response, but can lead to a loss of 
autonomy.  Organisations may therefore decide on other ways to manage environmental 
demands.  One example is controlling the definition of satisfaction, particularly if there is 
room in interpreting criteria.  It is difficult for external entities to question output and so the 
organisation retains discretion (ibid, p99).  Alternatively, organisations can flexibly change 
activities in response to environmental conditions.   Organisations adapt by selecting the 
market [funding] segment that they serve (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p107).  Furthermore, 
organisations can avoid conditions which demand compliance altogether by reducing 
resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p108).   Finally, organisational structures 
may also help support autonomy.  Larger organisations have more power and leverage within 
the environment.  However, growth can create more interdependency rather than less if not 
carefully managed (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p130).   
 
3.2 Resource Dependence and Charities 
 
RDP is highly pertinent to research in charities (Doyle, et al., 2016; Helmig, Jegers, & 
Lapsley, 2004; Verbruggen, Christiaens, & Milis, 2011). Agostino and Lapsley (2012) 
examine the interdependencies between charities and the government, highlighting the 
varying profound impacts on charities when council budgets were cut.  A number of studies 
consider how diversified revenue strategies in charities impact upon resource dependence. 
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Carroll & Stater (2009) find this leads to greater financial stability in charities. Froelich 
(1999) suggests charities have moved away from concentrated dependence on a single 
revenue strategy in order to reduce their vulnerability to uncertain income streams and funder 
influence, however new challenges manifest in growing constraints and management tasks 
which divert resources from mission-oriented efforts. It has also been reported that when 
charities alter their locus of dependence and change their pattern of diversification, there can 
be a negative impact upon fundraising efficiency (de los Mozos, Duarte & Ruiz, 2016).  
 
The above studies rely heavily on the work of Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), however, Mitchell 
(2014) asserts that previous insights into resource dependence in charities have under 
appreciated the strategic capacity of these organisations to respond to their environment. 
Mitchell (2014) identifies specific tactics with which charities respond to conditions of 
resource dependence to safeguard their autonomy. Three categories of strategic response are 
presented: adaptation, avoidance, and shaping.  Within adaptation, charities may employ the 
tactic of alignment where charities adjust their programming to suit the preferences of donors. 
Avoidance entails tactics include: revenue diversification; selectivity where a charity will 
reject restricted funding when it is incompatible with current organisational goals; and 
specialization, where an organisation carves out a specific niche for itself, this is generally 
categorised by high donor demand and low organisational supply. Finally, shaping tactics 
include donor education and compromise. Both Mitchell (2014) and Kheing & Dahles (2015) 
suggest that charities will employ strategies which will preserve organisational autonomy. 
Such responses are of particular relevance to this current study.  
 
Within a charity setting, RDP suggests a complex relationship between level of financial 
dependence and mission autonomy which requires further research (Verschuere & Corte, 
2014).  This research project builds upon these insights and considers the internal nuances of 
funder demands for information in charities. 
4 Research Design 
 
4.1 Research Setting 
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This study investigates how mid size charities – defined as having incomes between £25,000 
and £1m (NCVO, 2016; SCVO, 2014) - continue to pursue social mission in conditions of 
high dependence on grants. The research setting is the Scottish charity sector which makes a 
significant social and economic impact. There are 24,055 registered charities in Scotland 
handling an estimated £10bn of assets (OSCR, 2016).  Charities are a subset of the wider not 
for profit sector, and as such they are non profit and non governmental. The sector is distinct 
from both the private and public sector in terms of motivation, activity, resources, and 
societal contribution (Connolly, Hyndman, & McConville, 2013).    In Scotland, under the 
Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 s7, to become a charity an organisation 
must work towards one or more defined charitable purposes and provide public benefit in 
Scotland or elsewhere. The role of charities in the delivery of public services in Scotland is 
increasing (Lindsay, Osborne, & Bond, 2014). Yet, the environment within which these 
organisations operate is increasingly fragile in the contemporary world (Agostino & Lapsley, 
2012). The financial crisis and the age of public sector austerity have presented substantial 
challenges for mid sized charities in particular (NCVO, 2016). Recent reports suggest that the 
financial crisis has hit these charities the hardest, as mid size charities have lost a higher 
proportion of total income compared to their larger counterparts (NCVO, 2016).  The SCVO 
(2014) terms the organisations in this income bracket as the ‘squeezed middle’, deemed too 
large to rely on donations and volunteers, yet too small to win contract funding, resulting in a 
heavy reliance on grant funding.   
 
Grants may be awarded to charities from a range of organisations. For, this paper we identify 
four major types of grant funder: private trusts & foundations, private companies, public 
governmental, public non-governmental. Private trusts and foundations are a key source of 
income for charitable organisations. A report by Traynor and Walker (2015) considered the 
top 2500 grant makers in the UK and estimated they give £2.65 billion each year to charities 
and other voluntary organisations. Assets held by these trusts and foundations are estimated 
to be in the region of £45 billion, this gives them independence to provide funding to 
charities, with many large foundations having permanent endowments which are used to 
generate income. Asset values and investment income have reduced as a result of the 
financial crisis where actual grant spending by these organisations has only recently 
recovered to pre-recession levels (Traynor & Walker, 2015). One of the largest grant giving 
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trusts in Scotland is the Robertson Trust which distributed £14.8 million in 2015/16 
(Robertson Trust, 2017).  
 
Corporate entities are estimated to provide approximately 2% of income to the charity sector, 
with an estimated £420 million in donations in 2016, corporate giving has decreased in recent 
years, down from £658 million in 2014. The largest donations come from Lloyds Banking 
Group with £64 million and ITV plc with £24 million (Reynolds, Huyton & Hobson, 2017). 
In terms of public money which is non-governmental, this would include organisations who 
distribute public donations such as comic relief, children in need and the big lottery fund 
which awarded £1 billion in grants in 2014/15, 95.6% of which went to the voluntary and 
community sector (BLF, 2017). The Big Lottery Fund Scotland published the success rates 
for grant applications between April 2016 and March 2017, these varied from 40% to 70% 
depending on the type of fund offered (BLF, 2017), highlighting the competitive nature of 
these grants. In Scotland public sector funding for charities has dropped in recent years by as 
much as 18%, as grants have been replaced by competitive commissioning and contract 
models, where larger organisations dominate the market (SCVO, 2016).  
 
These sources of grant funding are competitive, and there are limited funds available relative 
to funding applications (Coyte, Rooney, & Phua, 2013), which coupled with a reduction in 
overall awards by some funders, these medium sized charities face substantial uncertainty 
around their income streams. Meanwhile, these charities are seeing an increase in demand for 
their services, tackling disadvantage in flexible ways that larger charities, business and the 
public sector cannot, and often reaching those facing the greatest disadvantage (Hunter, 
2016).   Mid size charities are therefore particularly apt to analyse the conditions of grant 
dependency and mission drift.  
 
4.2 Data Collection & Analysis 
 
In order to interrogate the myriad of ways that funder demands may impact on charities 
information systems and social mission, four case studies were conducted with mid size 
Scottish charities and 12 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 grant funders. 
Data was collected from key informants working with charities and funders working to 
distribute resources (Jones, 1996). The case study charities all work to support individuals 
and families of individuals with additional support needs. The charitable purposes of these 
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case studies is “The relief of those in need by reason of age, ill health, disability, financial 
hardship or other disadvantage” ("Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005,").   
 
Case studies were selected for the collection of rich data (Stake, 1995). The common area of 
work for the charities allowed a degree of parity across cases to assist comparisons, and to 
eliminate noise from other factors.   The cases were given the pseudonyms: North, South, 
East and West. The charities were selected according to the total income and nature of 
services outlined above (see table 3, below).  Data within the charities came from two main 
sources: documentation, and semi-structured interviews.   The individuals interviewed had 
expertise in various aspects of the grant funding process or in fulfilling social mission. The 
themes of the interviews revolved around mission, accountability, the grant funding process, 
measuring performance and either details on the accounting processes, or about the nature of 
front line services as appropriate.   Documents collected from charities included trustee 
annual reports (TAR), as well as examples of confidential funding applications and reports.   
Internal performance measurement documentation and management accounts of the charities 
were also used in analysis.  We examined the extent to which mission drift had occurred 
because of grant funding. Challenges exist in defining and identifying mission drift 
(Cornforth, 2014; Weisbrod, 2004). In order to assess whether mission drift occurred, we 
considered how the charities had deviated from their original mission and how current 
activities aligned to the charities mission. The nature of activities was investigated via self-
reporting through interviews, analysing the financial reports and documents to funders, and 
utilising the definitions and understanding of mission drift gained from the literature.  
 
In addition to the case study settings, the research study encompassed individual interviews 
employed in a range of funding bodies. The themes for funder interviews centred on the 
management of grant applications, monitoring of grants and the wider accountability 
requirements of the funders themselves.  Further details of interviewees are given in table 1. 
Most interviews2 were conducted by both authors, transcribed and analysed according to 
themes from RDP.  The analysis of interviews was conducted in word and excel.  Key themes 
and features of the charities were agreed upon by both authors, utilising insights from RDP to 
understand and explain the different experiences in environment and social mission (Ritchie 
& Lewis, 2003). 
                                                 
2 Solo author interviews (7) – F8, F5 & F6; C19; C11; F11, F12 
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Insert table 1 here 
5 Findings 
The four cases analysed within this study all exhibit varying degrees of dependency on grant 
funding, with 3 of the 4 cases obtaining over half of their income from grants.  RDP explains 
the varying responses employed by the charities, highlighting diverse approaches to 
managing money and mission.  The findings are structured around three key themes: the 
grant funding environment; interdependence in charities and funders; and funder demands 
and mission drift.  
 
5.1 The Grant Funding Environment: The Demand for Accounting and 
Performance Information 
 
The social control of organisations is operated through interdependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978, pp. 39-61). In this setting, charities must engage with funders to obtain financial 
resources to operate and realise social mission.  In return, charities must be responsive to 
funder demands.  As outlined previously, the grant funding environment is currently very 
challenging for the cases. The stretched grant funding bodies rely substantially on accounting 
and performance information to manage awards.   
 
Currently, financial resources are concentrated in a small number of grant giving bodies.  To 
illustrate, there are 174 grant making bodies in Scotland who distribute more than £5,000 
annually to charity organisations compared to 8,321 active mid-size charities (OSCR, 2017).  
The concentration of resources results in an asymmetric distribution of power (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  The charities who apply for funding are therefore willing to meet the 
demands of the funders, as the resources provided are critical for survival. 
There are several consequences from this context.  One pertinent item for this study is the 
reliance on the accounting and performance mechanisms provided in formal documentation 
to create and maintain relationships between funders and beneficiary charities.  Further 
information is provided in table 2, below.  It is relevant to note that there are differences in 
requirements with some larger funders appearing more onerous in their demands than, for 
example some of the smaller trusts. Charities noted that obtaining money from certain larger 
funders enhanced their credibility with other funders. 
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The funders explained in interviews that they need to manage the volume of demand in terms 
of applications from the individual charities.  Funders minimise their own administrative 
activities to maximise monies available for distribution, this forces the grant giving bodies to 
actively manage communication channels with grant applicants (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, 
p98) .  As a result, charity applicants are unaware of other funding applications and the 
priorities and pressures in the requisite award round.  Therefore, an individual charity has to 
‘compete’ for grants (Glennon, Hannibal, & Meehan, 2017).  Furthermore, the charities vying 
for grant awards have very low discretion in how resources are allocated (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978, p47).  The power to determine deserving causes remains with the grant giving bodies 
based on objectives, constitution and quality of applications received, as highlighted by the 
funders interviewed for this study.   
Insert table 2 here 
In addition, grant funding is managed through restricted time frames.   Financial awards for 
projects are often limited to 3 – 5 years.  This is problematic for these charities as when this 
funding ends, there is no guarantee that further sources can be found to fund the service, 
jeopardising its survival. In addition, many funders reported that they did not fund 
longstanding projects and were attracted by new and innovative ideas. For applicant charities, 
the importance of the resource relates not just to the extent of funding, but also to its relative 
certainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p46).  This 3/5 year cycle creates an unstable funding 
environment for the charities.  Stability is a central aspect of organizational survival (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978, p47) as without funding , the charities found it very difficult to plan, for 
example, the chair of East (C15) explained: 
“If you’re trying to agree a project with (a partner) wanting to agree a programme 
of work, you can only really agree it for as far as you’ve got the funding horizon 
for.  So funding horizons can impact on that (the charity services).”  
 
In this challenging grant funding environment, the alignment of mid-size charitable activities 
with funder demands is highly desirable to enable financial stability, but concomitantly 
creating vulnerabilities for mission drift in beneficiary organizations.  The reliance on grant 
funding is analysed in more detail for the case charities, next.   
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5.2  The Interdependence of Charities and Funders 
 
In prior literature, the magnitude of reliance on external resources has been used to express 
financial interdependencies, explaining the varying degrees of empirical affirmation of RDT 
and its impact on organizations (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Verbruggen, et al., 2011).  
However, this study considers a multitude of factors discussed in Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
seminal work (1978) which demonstrates that additional organizational attributes impact on 
the criticality of grant resources to survival.  An overview of the four mid-size charities is 
provided in table 3, with information about social mission, staffing and financial context, 
including the reserves policy of each charity.   
 
North is a Scottish charity whose aim is to support families of disabled children and young 
people.   The charity has grown slowly since being set up in 1992, and subsequently, in 2007 
the charity was awarded a grant of £1m over five years from the Big Lottery Fund (BLF). 
This enabled the charity to employ more staff and to grow activities towards advocacy for 
parents of and young people with disabilities.  At the time, BLF constituted 70% of the 
charity’s income, although funding has since been diversified. The charity currently employs 
17 staff, most of whom are parents of disabled children themselves.  North is the most reliant 
on grant funding at 82% of total income. 
 
South offer dedicated play centres for children and young people with additional support 
needs, their mission is described as bringing fun and friendship to children with additional 
support needs across Scotland. South was established in 1986 and the service has developed 
substantially, now working with over 2000 individuals, from pre-school children to young 
people up to the age of 25. Services have expanded to a range of play, youth work services 
and training, operating in three separate centres. 
 
 
East is an arts-in-health charity whose aim is improve the experience of people in hospital 
and in hospice, residential and respite care by using the performing arts to encourage 
communication, interaction and laughter. East operates across two main programs, the first 
was established in 1999, and the second in 2001. Finally, West works to improve the lives of 
people with disabilities, running a range of group activities such as art, craft, computing, 
music, and swimming. West has a befriending project and gives grants to individuals, for 
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basic household equipment, and sporting achievements. They are predominantly funded 
through investment income, originating from a number of high value legacies. Government 
funding is precluded as West lobby for improved State provision of services. West is the least 
dependent on grant funding, comprising only 11% of total income, providing an important 
contrast to the other charities.  
 
Insert table 3 here 
RDP considers dependence in terms of resource importance and discretion of resource 
allocation and use (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp. 43-49).  The importance of the resource 
relates both to magnitude, as highlighted, and criticality for survival.  This approach 
identifies other features of the charities which contribute to the criticality of grant funding in 
the case settings.  Each charity is discussed in turn, next.  
 
The features of North demonstrate that grant funding is critical to its continued survival and 
therefore, grant awarding bodies will be able to exert extensive control over its activities.   
North obtains most of its income from grant awards (see table 3) and lacks alternative sources 
for money, due to its size and resources it cannot compete for public sector contracts.  North 
has significant financial commitments through salaries and leases.  In addition, North’s low 
reserves do not meet stated policy in the TAR.  Overall, the failure to obtain grant funding 
would substantially impact capacity for survival.  Consequently, RDP stipulates that North 
will ensure funder demands are serviced.   
 
Yet North has some advantage relating to the nature of its service knowledge and access to 
disadvantaged areas (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p48).  Skilled workers conduct highly 
specialised work, which is only visible to funders through direct reports from North.  This 
allows the charity discretion in actual activities, but an equally challenging onus to ensure 
that its services can demonstrably satisfy funder demands (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp. 104-
106).   One means of achieving this comes from North’s access to areas of maximum social 
deprivation (Hunter, 2016). Interviews with two funders – a private trust, and a public non-
governmental funder (F1 & F4) - identified the difficulty of directing resources to these areas 
and their desire to support the scarce initiatives used in the localities.  Therefore, North has 
higher discretion over the nature of its activities once grant funding is assured and justified. 
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South is less reliant on grant funding as it has more diversified income and greater flexibility 
in cost structure.  Total grant funding is 68% of total income, with the remainder from 
donations or service contract income3, reserves exceed stated policy.  Organisational 
adaptability to funding conditions is possible due to low rental costs and hourly paid staff.  
However, South has a transparent, understandable service that funders attempt to control 
through eligibility of users or nature of provision.   In addition, South has a high growth 
strategy and charity management draws heavily from commercial organisations.  This 
business like style has also been identified as a cause of mission drift (Hyndman, 2017).    
 
East’s significant organisational adaptability reduces dependency through minimal fixed 
financial commitments and independent contractors for service delivery.  Charity costs 
contract and expand according to grants received.  Furthermore, as the services have sectoral 
cross over between arts, health, and education, East can access a greater range of funder 
types.  This means grant funding resources, whilst critical, are less concentrated than for 
South and North (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p50).  The services East delivers require a 
specialist skill set and funder control over nature of delivery is minimal.  However, grant 
funding terms may specify beneficiaries. This flexibility in cost structure allows East 
considerable autonomy to focus on mission. 
 
West differs from the other case charities in several ways.  West has low dependency on 
grant income (see table 3), and it can fund most of its services through investment returns.  
Furthermore, reserves are within stated policy levels. The opportunity for funders to control 
activities at West is therefore low (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p51).  Unlike the other charities, 
West is wary of grant funding conflicting with the demands from other components of the 
environment.  Part of West’s social mission is to campaign for improved public sector 
support for its service users, as a result public sector funding is not sought and further grant 
funding is pursued only if it corresponds with this lobbying agenda.   
    
This section demonstrates that dependence on the grant funding environment varies beyond 
the extent of financial reliance displayed in the four case studies.  The availability of 
alternative income sources, cost structure and the nature of services have been pertinent to 
                                                 
3 We classify donations and service contract income as ‘non-grant income’ therefore it is not necessary to 
distinguish between these two sources of funding in terms of amounts for this paper. 
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consider under RDT.  These intricacies highlighted by the theory have been integrated in 
table 4.  Furthermore, dependency has directed the case study charities towards particular 
approaches to enacting the environment and managing environmental demands, which are 
discussed next.  
 
5.3 Obtaining Money, Maintaining Mission: Funder Demands and Mission 
Drift 
The enacted environment is created through a process of attention and interpretation, 
supported by information systems within the focal organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, 
pp. 74 - 76).   If information is produced solely for funder needs, mission drift may occur 
unless mission priorities receive requisite management attention.  Case study evidence 
highlights the risks of mission drift because of funder influence over accounting and 
performance information. South is particularly vulnerable as information is produced to 
satisfy environmental demands.   However, RDP explains preservation of social mission in 
the other charities.  The combination of organisational attributes and managerial strategies 
enable these organisations to fulfil mission in an uncertain funding environment.  Table 4 
summarises the ensuing discussion by connecting environmental dependencies, information 
systems and mission for each charity.   
Insert table 4 here  
5.3.1 The Enacted Environment: Funders’ Influence in Accounting and Performance 
Information 
Environmental influence in accounting and performance information occurred in North, 
South and East.  Influence was less marked in West.  Funder requirements dictated expense 
allocations, project boundaries and influenced financial decision making.  Likewise, 
performance information in these dependent charities is highly aligned to funder 
requirements.   Apart from West, the remaining cases have a dedicated fundraising function, 
which is viewed as important, particularly for South and East. Fundraisers are completely 
dependent on the information system to monitor and report on the funding. Yet the distinct 
ways that the charities manage information and demands created resilience to mission drift.  
The following discussion begins with funder influence on accounting information before 
turning to performance information.   
The accounting information produced in highly dependent North, South and East was driven 
by funder needs.  With relatively low resources to invest in support functions, the detailed 
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accounting systems accommodated the funders’ demand for project budgets and cost variance 
analyses (see table 2). The management accounts used for internal monitoring for North, 
South and East reflected the grant terms and conditions in place.  If necessary this could 
require an intricate set of accounts to ensure all expenditure complied with grant award 
expectations, as funding conditions varied from full cost recovery to capital expenditure only.  
Financial control and decision making was based on project boundaries, as reflected in 
discussions with board chairs of South and East (C11 & C15).  In contrast, West’s 
information system was reflective of its distinct enacted environment focused on stewardship 
of investment assets and State provision for service users.  As Pfeffer & Salancik note:  
“Organizations learn to attend to new sectors of their environments when these sectors 
begin to demand certain performances of the organization.  Those that do not develop 
new, appropriate information systems are less likely to survive.  Either through 
adaptation or selection similar results will emerge – as environments change, 
organizational information processing and attentional mechanisms will change.“ 
(1978, p76).   
As accounting information drives both financial control and funder demands in these case 
charities, susceptibility to mission drift occurs.  Likewise, funders exerted extensive influence 
over the nature of performance information in the highly dependent charities.  Yet each 
charity has distinct responses to this type of information collected.  Performance practices are 
now presented for each case study.  
North’s performance information system was historically created at the request of its major 
funder, the Big Lottery Fund.  Unable to report back on outcomes, North was obliged to 
develop an information system which captured the charitable achievements of the grant 
project.  Substantial discretion in design of the system was given by the funder, and therefore 
North adapted and expanded the information captured for its own strategic priorities.  This 
resonates with the experiences of co-production in other settings  (O'Dwyer & Boomsma, 
2015).  North generated specialist knowledge which was not known externally, allowing 
them to approach funders for specific funding, and increase autonomy through controlling the 
satisfaction of funder demands (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p100). The charity was then able to 
target funders with specific issues, this is particularly relevant given that North had access to 
high priority funding areas from maximum social deprivation. For example, the chief 
executive (C1b) stated: 
 “I look at the dataset, and say ‘ok, all these families are ‘funded’, but these one’s 
aren’t, so who could I go to who might fund that lot kind of thing …so I actually 
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selected out a dataset and said we’re applying for a grant to fund these families who 
come to our helpline”.  
The original design of the accounting and performance information stemmed from the need 
to comply with the major funder to North.  However, over the years, the charity adapted this 
and developed a much more focused approach to achieving mission.  North received funding 
through its superior knowledge of need (Mitchell. 2014). The organisation has adopted what 
the front-line workers (C4 & C5) term a more ‘professional approach’ and mission has been 
subtly refined. For example, previously staff would take out rubbish or open and read the 
mail of service users unable to do so themselves, however, boundaries were created after the 
development of the performance information system, and such extraneous services stopped. 
Instead, needy individuals were referred on to relevant support services. These parameters 
allowed more people to use the service whilst core mission remained unchanged.  
In South, performance information was produced by an influential fundraising department 
reporting to funders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p77), and fuelling the charity’s growth.  
Concurrently, service quality was assessed by front line workers in a daily diary focusing on 
beneficiaries.  Thus, the information produced by South for funders was primarily 
compliance based (Moxham, 2010 & 2013), and performance information aimed at 
improvement was the responsibility of the front-line workers. 
Compliance with funder demands in South has been fuelled by the strategy to grow as a 
response to the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p131). Growth expanded services to 
new user categories. Funding new projects was relatively easy as programmes could be 
adapted to funder preferences (Mitchell, 2014), but the charity found funding for 
longstanding projects problematic. As growth occurred, back office costs increased.  
Complying with funder demands had also placed pressure on the service and resulted in a 
loss of discretion and autonomy for the organisation, leaving it vulnerable to mission drift. 
For example, the chief executive (C16) gave an example where meeting funder targets had 
compromised the quality of service being delivered.: 
“it is a numbers game, so for example with funding by [retail] bank, they want to 
support 1000 children from special schools…we are driving that so hard...we are not 
doing that again because having 1000 children through your schools programme 
means that we would have been better trying to have 600 because the 600 would get a 
better quality experience than 1000”.  
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Growth had resulted in increasing interdependencies with funders, requiring greater effort 
directed to manage relationships with others (Froelich, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p92). 
This has had an impact on the direction of the charity, who have moved away from only 
providing to children with disabilities to services for all children at weekends, including those 
without disabilities. This goes beyond stated mission (see table 3).   
 
The mission in South has moved into the background as the focus on growth has occupied 
board discussions.  The Chairman of South (C11) noted: 
“Are we affected by what funders want? Well yes to some extent I suppose we are … 
think of our expansion into [other parts of Scotland].  Because that’s what funders 
want.  I suspect if they hadn’t wanted those areas, we might have gone somewhere 
else...  In things like Geography, it’s not going to influence us in if you like in what is 
the essence of [South].  Or what is the culture of the place.” 
The performance information produced for funders was also produced for the board and 
affirmed the need to expand to meet social mission.  Of all the case study charities, South was 
susceptible to mission drift as the environment drove the growth strategy of the organisation. 
South was very business-oriented and prominence was given to fundraisers, who were set 
income targets. This may lead them to prioritise money over mission and act as a further 
trigger for mission drift (Weisbrod, 2004; Hyndman, 2017). It is clear from the above 
examples that South was aware of environmental impact.    
In East, the information system assisted the charity to flexibly respond to its financial 
situation over time.  The benefits of charitable activities were already known in house, due to 
evidence based practice studies available internationally.  The general manager (C13) 
reported that performance information was for external use: 
“I mean to be honest a lot of the time it is just captured because of the funders, and 
this is one of the things that we sort of do get a little bit frustrated with is a lot of it is 
about figures and not necessarily about the quality”. 
The information system captured activity details of practitioners, focusing on numbers of 
beneficiaries and outcomes associated with these.   This resulted in a very detailed system of 
recording and managing information for internal and grant funder requirements. In addition, 
the information systems acted as a buffer to further control by the environment (ibid, p77), 
with the general manager (C13) highlighting that: 
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“Our mission statement is that we want to be able to visit and engage with every sick 
or vulnerable child across Scotland. Now, sick or vulnerable, that, vulnerable can 
mean anything” (emphasis added). 
In contrast to the other cases, the services offered by East were very flexible and could 
therefore be adapted to fit the requirements of a range of different funders (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978, p.107). This ability to adapt was possible because of two factors, the nature 
of the service which spanned arts, health, and education, and the flexibility in terms of the 
cost structure of the charity. The charity had also worked to diversify the service which 
insulated the organisation against the effects of dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p.127; 
Mitchell, 2014). Regardless of the ability to reach a wide range of funders, there was still a 
challenge in terms of funding core projects.  The desire for something new forced the 
organisation to become creative by rebranding existing services. The chief executive (C12) 
noted how East was able to ‘slice up the pie in different ways’ which opened up a wider 
range of funding, yet maintain activities and keep in line with their original mission.   
 
West had low dependency on the external environment, enabling the charity to remain largely 
focused on social mission.  West had a streamlined accounting system which reflected the 
low numbers of grants managed.  The enacted environment was directed towards the 
priorities of maintaining investment values and keeping abreast of the developments in state 
policies as described by the chair of the finance committee (C19).  Despite minimal reporting 
requirements, the service manager (C18) noted that performance information was produced 
for internal purposes to assess service quality to highly vulnerable beneficiaries.   
West sought to avoid influence on two levels. Firstly, by minimising the reliance on grant 
funding and ensuring it was not critical to the operation of the charity, and secondly the way 
it identified funding opportunities. Small grants were targeted from private trusts, who were 
perceived to have minimal reporting requirements, and no capacity or desire to influence 
West’s activities. For example, the chief executive (C16) explained his funding preference:  
“None of them are giving us a lot of money, but actually the effort I put in to getting 
ten lots of £2,000 is less that I would put in to say £20,000 out of one outfit. To me 
this works. It’s a very simple system, because it’s just a letter a year.” 
The Chief Executive had a clear funding strategy, avoiding funders whose demands would 
compromise mission which was of fundamental importance 
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“the Board doesn’t want to have funding that tells it how to run its charity, which is 
frankly what some funders are doing… I am working with a Board that understands, 
actually not just understands but encourages my concept of trying to work for high 
quality for the most disabled rather than ticking a box saying yes, I can write 12 
names down of people who are attending, and that actually matters to me” (chief 
executive, C16). 
 
Therefore, mission was retained in West and there was a very clear focus on ‘protecting what 
we have’ which was a view shared by the chief executive (C16) and by the board member 
who was also a beneficiary (C17). Dependence on grant funding therefore had differing 
impacts on charitable missions for the case charities.  South was the most vulnerable to 
mission drift, although it was not the most financially dependent on grant funders.  In 
contrast, North, whose dependency levels were high, had greater autonomy in mission 
fulfilment.  East’s organisational structure enabled resilience from the funding environment 
while West benefited from substantial financial independence, allowing it to select funding 
relationships that would support mission.   
 
Information systems allow the charities to fulfil accountability demands to funders, while 
also acting as a buffer against mission drift. In North, the information system has allowed 
them to target specific funders or funding opportunities because of specialist knowledge, 
ensuring mission drift does not occur. In South and East, mission drift is also buffered 
because the performance information that is produced for the funders is not an intrinsic part 
of the performance evaluation internally. However, the fundraising status has been increased 
in these charities, particularly in South, which could potentially have an impact on mission 
drift. Apart from West, the remaining cases all have a fundraising function with specific 
fundraising expertise. The existence of this, and the presence of fundraisers who are driven to 
raise money and meet targets to ensure the survival of the organisation, means there could be 
implications for mission drift. Fundraising is completely dependent on the information 
system to monitor and report on the function, therefore this also has the potential to enable 
mission drift. This was visible in South, where fundraisers had targets, with 
acknowledgement that certain funding had compromised the quality of the service offered. 
6 Conclusion: Charitable Mission & the Impact of Funders 
For mid size charities, the grant funding environment is increasingly prominent in ensuring 
survival through financial solvency and pursuit of social mission.    This paper sought to 
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investigate: How do mid size charities continue to pursue social mission in conditions of high 
dependence on grants?  The findings demonstrate that funding requirements have a 
meaningful impact on the structure of internal charity accounting systems, which could cause 
mission drift.  Thus, the nuances of funder relationships are pertinent in determining 
dependence on grant funding. Managerial responses to external demands play a key role in 
protecting social mission.  They utilise a range of strategies and tactics to retain autonomy 
and mission while still responding to funder requirements. The findings affirm the relevance 
of RDP in analysing the charity sector and its ability to explain diverse responses to a 
challenging environment.  However, limitations are acknowledged, and more research is 
needed with more cases, more variation in organisational sizes, and in different research 
settings. 
The present grant funding environment for mid size charities exhibits highly concentrated 
resources which are critical in ensuring charitable survival.  We would argue that the 
accounting systems shed light on how external influence can lead to mission drift in mid size 
charities.  Charities and funders use bespoke accounting and performance information as an 
integral mechanism to manage grant relationships.   The information produced within 
charities is directly influenced by the demands of the grant funding environment, with 
accounting information accommodating the different grant requirements used in service 
delivery.   Furthermore, the charities noted that their wider performance information 
prioritises service user numbers over quality of services provided, at the behest of funders.  
Cumulatively, these shape the information produced by charities for decision making, 
creating a mechanism for mission drift caused by external influence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978, p81)   Despite these acute funding pressures, the charities are largely able to manage 
the demands of the environment to protect charitable mission.    
Charities utilised a range of strategies and tactics to maintain organisational autonomy and 
minimise the influence of funders. These included: compliance, avoidance, controlling the 
definition of satisfaction, and organisational change strategies such as  These strategies 
resonate with prior literature on RDP (REFS) and particularly Mitchell’s (2014) development 
in relation to the nonprofit sector North employed a shaping strategy through its superior 
knowledge of need  (Mitchell, 2014), gained from the information system. South pursued an 
adaptation strategy through growth to align itself with funders’ interests in specific areas of 
Scotland (Mitchell, 2014).     Diversification of funding was utilised in East which protected 
them against the effects of dependence (Froelich, 1999). Finally, West utilised an avoidance 
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strategy, shunning funders who were perceived to be controlling, this was possible due to the 
low dependence on grant funding (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Mitchell, 2014). However,  
The efforts by charities to fulfil accountability to the funders are substantial.    In all four case 
studies, it was apparent that activities related to mission had changed subtly over time in 
response to the requirements of funders.  North moved to a more professional service.  
South’s change was also important as its services expanded greatly due to growth in funding.  
This arguably left South susceptible to mission drift.  For East, mission was linked to its 
therapeutic programme rather than beneficiaries allowing more flexibility in delivery.  In 
West, the mission of the charity was buffered by its comfortable financial footing.  Moreover, 
its strategy of avoidance for grant funding meant that West was not challenged over 
activities.  
Three out of four of the charities managed funder demands whilst fulfilling social mission. 
Although subtle changes had occurred in North and East, they were still very much in line 
with the original mission. There is evidence, however, that South had deviated from core 
mission. Mission drift is acknowledged to be an unintended consequence stemming from 
misaligned organisational objectives in a challenging funding environment. Funders do not 
seek to cause mission drift, and in fact, aim to be supportive.  The perspective from the 
charities, however, was that funder demands were onerous. There is scope for further 
research in understanding the rationale and motivations of the grant giving process; , how 
funders select, manage and assess grants, and how they deal with their own upward 
accountabilities.   Given the central role of accounting and performance information 
established in this paper, the funders’ management of grants deserves further research 
attention from an accounting perspective.    
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